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1. Introduction  
Recent research on voting behaviour has confirmed the existence of a trend towards 
candidate-centred politics. While long ago the media and public discourse had 
emphasized the role of individual political actors in contemporary politics, such claims 
had only found mixed evidence in empirical studies. More recently, a thorough 
consideration of the temporal dimension, the effort to develop comparative analyses, and 
both theoretical and methodological refinements, produced consistent evidence on the 
importance of leaders as determinants of vote choice (Garzia, 2014; Lobo and Curtice, 
2015). However important, these contributions have moved straightforwardly to 
examining leaders’ effects on vote choice without carefully considering their potential 
impact on the baseline decision to turn out to the ballot box. While leaders have been 
demonstrated to influence choice over different party options, this is likely to be preceded 
by an impact over turnout decisions. In impacting vote choice, leader effects can operate 
in two possible ways: a) capturing votes who otherwise would belong to his/her party’s 
competitors or b) motivating individuals who otherwise would not vote at all to vote for 
his/her party. Therefore, just as party identification expresses a preference across parties 
which simultaneously drives individuals to vote and to select a given party rather than 
another, attitudes towards leaders could act in a similar fashion – if a leader is sufficiently 




At the policy-making level, the capacity of leaders to connect with the electorate, 
counterbalance disengagement trends and mobilize voters to go to the ballots seems to be 
more widely recognised, as illustrated by the recent Spitzenkandidaten initiative. In an 
attempt to increase turnout rates in the 2014 European Parliament elections, the European 
Parliament’s political groups have decided to publicly support a lead candidate for the 
presidency of the European Commission. In what constitutes an example of the 
importance attributed to individual political actors in contemporary politics – even at the 
transnational level –, for the first time voters were given the possibility to have a say on 
which candidate they wanted ahead of the European Commission. Facing increasing 
Euroscepticism and disengagement in European elections, this was perceived as an 
effective strategy to enhance EU democracy and promote more participated elections in 
a context of personalization of politics. 
The generalized decline in turnout rates across contemporary Western democracies is a 
symptom of the dealignment process at the origin of the personalization of politics, 
establishing a theoretical relationship for the mechanism through which leaders could 
impact turnout decisions. Yet, it is still to be determined to what extent can voters’ 
evaluations of leaders have an effect on turnout. Likewise, studies on individual-level 
turnout have largely disregarded the role of political leaders in stimulating electoral 
participation. 
This study aims to fill this gap shared by the personalization of politics and the turnout 
literature. In this way, it attempts to offer a contribution by drawing attention to the 
mobilizing potential of political leaders and discussing the possible relevance of a more 
frequent inclusion of variables accounting for voters’ assessments of the candidates 
running for election in turnout models. 
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The article proceeds as follows. The next section problematizes the relationship between 
turnout and the personalization of politics, shedding light on the potential mechanisms 
through which turnout rates can be affected by the performance of party leaders. The third 
section describes the data and methods used in the empirical analysis. The fourth section 
presents the main results, followed by a section including various robustness tests. Section 
6 extends the results’ section by exploring potential contextual effects of the political and 
electoral system as moderators. Finally, the conclusions of the study are discussed in the 
last section. 
 
2. Turnout and the personalization of politics: a missing link 
The personalization of politics refers to the process through which individual political 
actors have been gaining increased importance compared to political parties (Karvonen, 
2010). Within the framework of this thesis, over the last decades we have been witnessing 
a tendency towards a greater preponderance of party leaders in the political arena 
(Wattenberg, 1991). This has been particularly notorious in the media discourse: political 
content is framed around the visible faces of political parties, executives became named 
after their leaders, personality profiles are thoroughly compared, and televised debates 
between party leaders are discussed by media pundits as a decisive factor to electoral 
outcomes. Also political parties have contributed to this trend by focusing their 
communication strategies in their leaders through the development of increasingly 
individualized campaigns (Lisi and Santana-Pereira, 2014; Zittel and Gschwend, 2008); 
broadening their leader selection procedures to wider selectorates, ultimately resulting in 
the proliferation of primaries in many European political parties (Cross and Pilet, 2016; 
Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Kenig, 2009); and enhancing the leader’s role within the 
contemporary types of political parties by conceding them more power and autonomy to 
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make individualized decisions (Lobo, 2008). At the electoral system level, numerous 
European countries have been implementing personalizing reforms, altering electoral 
rules so that citizens can express their preferences for candidates and have a greater 
decision-power over the allocation of seats (Renwick and Pilet, 2016). Lastly, multiple 
studies have demonstrated that voters’ evaluations of political leaders have an effect on 
voting behaviour (Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt, 2011; Bittner, 2011; Garzia, 2013; Lobo and 
Curtice, 2015) and that this impact has been growing across time (Garzia, 2014; Garzia, 
Silva, De Angelis, 2018). 
Despite recent studies having established that assessments of party leaders do have an 
impact on individual vote choice, research on the personalization of politics has not yet 
devoted attention to a former aspect of the voting decision process: the decision to turn 
out. The relationship between leader effects and vote choice has been drawn without any 
reflection on the intermediate stage when the voter decides whether to go to the polls or 
to refrain from voting. Since leaders were demonstrated to have an impact on voters’ 
choices over different parties, it seems plausible that at least some of these voters are also 
driven to the polls by the appeal of political leaders.  
The theoretical framework underlying research confirming leader effects on vote choice 
applies similarly to individual-level turnout. Individualization and the process of 
dealignment weakened the long-standing bonds between voters and political parties. 
Following the erosion of cleavages which structured voting behaviour, voters have 
become gradually detached from the set of social and political attitudes in the origin of 
party identification. With individualization, group-based ideological alignments on the 
basis of the political cleavages have faded. This has led voters to become increasingly 
unconstrained from the identification bonds resulting from previous alignments with 
political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Dalton, 2012). Dalton (2002, 30-31) 
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estimates the number of individuals who identify with a political party to have declined, 
for example, about 18% in Sweden, 16% in the United States, 15% in Germany, and 14% 
in France, in just a few decades. Alignments, and the cleavages in their origin, conditioned 
not only vote choice but also turnout decisions. The determinants of turnout and vote 
choice have historically largely coincided, which is unsurprising since motivations on the 
grounds of decisions upon the latter are inevitably extensive to the former. Vote choice 
presupposes a coherent behaviour regarding turnout since it is impossible to choose 
between parties without having cast a vote, and the reasons which drive an individual to 
choose a party over another are very much associated with the reasons that lead him/her 
to turn out instead of abstaining. Therefore, it follows that a structural change in the 
determinants of the latter element of the voting calculus are tied to transformations in the 
more primary stage of the decision-making process. Thus, if rather than repeatedly 
following party heuristics, voters have become more sensible to short-term factors in their 
voting choice decisions – such as candidates or performance assessments –, the same 
factors are likely to determine turnout decisions. 
Moreover, given the importance of dealignment as a key cause of the personalization of 
politics, and the fact that one of the most evident symptoms of this process has been the 
generalized decline in voter turnout rates across contemporary Western democracies 
(Blais and Rubenson, 2013), there are theoretical reasons to expect an effect of leader 
evaluations on turnout decisions. The few studies which have linked dealignment with 
leader effects have focused exclusively on whether leader evaluations have a higher 
impact on swing voters, late deciders or voters without party identification (Gidengil, 
2011; Lobo, 2015). The turnout dimension of the dealignment process has been 
surprisingly neglected thus far, although an analysis of turnout decisions with a particular 
focus on the impact of party leaders appears to be theoretically pertinent. 
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The potential of political leaders to act as mobilizing agents and foster turnout has 
recently been acknowledged by policy-makers at the European Union level. The elections 
for the European Parliament have historically been poorly participated, not reaching the 
50% threshold of turnout since 1999. The decision for the Spitzenkandidaten strategy in 
the 2014 European Parliament elections, comes with a recognition of the potential of 
candidates to increase the salience of the elections and mobilize more voters to cast a 
ballot, “raising the turnout for European elections by strengthening the link between the 
elections of the representatives of the citizens with the selection and election process of 
the head of the European executive” (European Commission 2013, 6).  
A recent study assesses the impact of this initiative on turnout decisions and finds a 
mobilizing effect of candidate recognition and campaign activity of the three most visible 
candidates on turnout; additionally, candidate recognition was also found to strengthen 
the impact of campaign activities on turnout (Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa, 2015). Having 
found such effects in second-order elections, where arguably voters still had very limited 
awareness of the candidates running for election, it can be argued the effect could even 
be stronger in first-order elections. In the latter type, campaigns are more intense and 
personalized (canvassing is easier, the candidates are more familiar, their presence in the 
media is stronger, and TV debates assume a major importance) and voters are also more 
prone to be recipients of political messages and information. 
Noticeably, also the individual-level turnout literature has disregarded the relationship 
between turnout and political leaders, whether measured through voters’ evaluations of 
leaders’ personality traits or general leader evaluation scales. Apart from studies on 
American presidential elections (Adams, Dow, and Merrill, 2006), the role of candidates 
in voters’ turnout decisions in general elections has been largely ignored. This is puzzling 
given the importance early attributed by Campbell and his colleagues (Campbell et al., 
7 
 
1960) to the general role of attitudes on voting behaviour and the specific consideration 
of attitudes towards candidates in their research. Furthermore, within the framework of 
these psychological models, attitudinal elements have often been demonstrated to be 
associated with turnout, as is the case with attitudes towards the EU (Kentmen-Cin, 2017) 
and voting and elections (Blais, 2014). Therefore, attitudes towards party leaders, as 
increasingly relevant actors in contemporary politics, could also play a role in citizens’ 
turnout decisions. In this sense, also from the point of view of individual-level turnout 
literature, it would be relevant to assess to what extent do leaders impact turnout 
decisions. 
This study explores this missing link by taking a step back in the decision-making process 
and addressing the effects of voters’ evaluations of party leaders on turnout decisions, 
hypothesizing that positive evaluations of leaders stimulate individuals to participate in 
elections. In addition, in line with previous research that demonstrated that, on vote 
choice, leaders may have a differentiated impact across respondents’ degree of 
dealignment (Gidengil, 2011; Lobo, 2015), it tests whether such leader effects on turnout 
are stronger on particularly dealigned voters, i.e., those lacking a party identification. 
Further, it also tests whether these effects are stronger for individuals who have been 
abstaining in past elections. The reasoning being that individuals who did not vote for the 
previous election are more likely to be structurally dealigned and thus more influenced 
by factors such as political leaders rather than party evaluations. With these theoretical 
expectations in mind, the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 H1: Voters’ evaluations of party leaders have a positive effect on their probability 
to turn out 
 H2: Leader effects on turnout are particularly impactful on independent voters 
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 H2.1.: Leader effects on turnout are inversely related to voters’ degree of party 
identification 
 H2.2.: Leader effects on turnout are stronger among voters who have abstained in 
the previous election  
 
Wattenberg (2002, 71-72) estimates turnout rates to have declined, for example, around 
19% in France, 15% in the United States, and 11% in the United Kingdom and Germany 
over the last half century. If leaders are found to have a mobilizing potential and the 
capacity to motivate individuals who otherwise would exclude themselves from 
participating in elections to vote, the personalization of politics may be argued to play a 
beneficial role in reconnecting voters with politics. Furthermore, the dealignment process 
would not necessarily mean a definitive large-scale retreat from politics but could be 
attenuated or even partially reversed by the positive effect of leaders.  
In addition to the advanced hypotheses, a second body of expectations can be added 
regarding the potential moderating role of political and electoral systems on leaders’ 
impact on turnout decisions. In line with findings from previous studies who found leader 
effects to be stronger in presidential contexts (Curtice and Hunjan, 2011; Curtice and Lisi, 
2015), the existence of differences in leader effects across different political systems is 
explored. In addition, following Balmas et al. (2014) theoretical distinction between 
centralized and decentralized personalization, electoral systems’ features favouring 
decentralized personalization are considered, as the latter type of personalization may 
depress party leader effects. In specific, it is explored a) whether (semi-)presidential 
regimes’ institutional design is more favourable to the existence of leader effects on 
turnout; b) whether smaller district sizes are harmful to party leader effects on turnout; 
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and c) whether the possibility to cast a personalized vote dampers leader effects on 
turnout.  A further theoretical account of these relationships and the empirical results of 
this exploratory analysis are provided in Section 6.  
 
Details on the dataset, variables and overall analytical strategy used to test the hypotheses 
follow in the next section. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Variable selection 
Given the variety of theoretical approaches to the study of individual-level turnout in 
contemporary democracies, difficulties arise to build a balanced model which is still able 
to account for the multitude of factors impacting turnout decisions. Unsurprisingly, a 
large number of covariates are frequently included in turnout models. However, since this 
is a thoroughly studied topic with results accumulated as a consequence of several 
decades of quality research, it is now possible to select the most accurate predictors in 
order to build parsimonious and informative models.  
Recently, Smets and van Ham (2013) have conducted a meta-analysis of individual-level 
research on voter turnout, accounting for 90 studies published over the first decade of this 
century on ten top-journals in political science and political behaviour. In this relevant 
contribution the authors analyse over 170 different independent variables and rate them 
as a result of their performance in the studies analysed. The authors consider six models 
of turnout: the resource model focuses on the conditioning role of voters’ resources in 
determining their participation; the mobilization model explores the mobilizing ability of 
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parties and other interest groups in driving turnout; the socialization model emphasizes 
the role of socialization in the formation of political attitudes and behaviours; rational 
choice models highlight the cost-benefit calculus of turning out to vote; the psychological 
model centres around voters’ cognitive characteristics; and the institutional model 
explores the influence of the political system on citizens decisions to vote.  
Smets and van Ham define a variable’s success rate as a result of a ponderation of its 
successes1 and the number of tests including this variable.2 For the present study, the 
variables with a success rate over 60% were pre-selected to be included in the individual-
level turnout model, largely covering the abovementioned streams of literature. This 
threshold was established for theoretical reasons since many of these variables do no 
longer hold theoretical pertinence; methodological reasons, since from a model 
estimation point of view parsimonious models tend to be preferable; and practical 
reasons, because the larger the number of covariates, the more likely it is that they are not 
going to be present in all election studies considered, thus harming comparability efforts. 
Admittedly, this decision comes with some caveats such as not taking into account effect 
size but only statistical significance, although the authors come up with a proxy measure 
of average effect size.  
 
3.2. Dataset and variable description 
                                                          
1 “In the vote-counting procedure, each test of a hypothesis is considered a ‘success’ when a coefficient is 
statistically significant and has the hypothesized direction. On the other hand, the hypothesis test is 
considered a ‘failure’ when it is found not to be significant and an ‘anomaly’ when the coefficient is 
statistically significant but is in the opposite direction than expected.” (Smets and van Ham, 2013, 346) 
2 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁄ 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠) ∗ 100 
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The data used in this analysis is derived from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES), a collaborative project which gathers data from worldwide post-electoral surveys 
through the incorporation of a common module in the National Election Studies (NES) 
of participant countries. Each country’s module is then compiled in the common dataset, 
allowing for data comparability on elections carried in a wide range of countries across 
similar time periods. The full releases of modules 3 (2006-11) and 4 (2011-16) were used, 
yielding a total of 50 election studies from 25 Western democracies – a full list of 
countries, election years and respective sample sizes is available in Appendix 1.3 
Additionally, whenever a pertinent variable was missing from the CSES study for a 
specific country, in order not to exclude this country or sacrifice the model by excluding 
relevant variables, a more recent version of the data from that country’s NES was used. 
Every time the NES had the missing variable it substituted the country sample of the 
CSES, to have more complete and up to date data – this was the case with Spain4. 
The harmonization of a large number of election studies from several countries under a 
common framework provided by the CSES was the main reason to prefer this dataset. 
This facilitates cross-country analysis in comparative studies, while providing quality 
data on the relevant independent variables to test this study’s propositions. It also avoids 
potential language barriers faced when collecting NES individually. Nevertheless, due to 
its comparative nature, the set of variables contained in the CSES modules is somewhat 
restricted and this constrains the number of possible covariates to be featured in the 
                                                          
3 Countries which enforce compulsory voting were not included. Italy (2013) and the UK (2010) were 
added to the sample through their respective NES. 
4 In CSES Module 3 Spain was missing the “turnout on the previous election”. Spain was also missing the 
variable referring to the organisational membership. 
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model. For example, media exposure and socio-economic status were relevant variables 
according to the pre-established criteria but could not be included in the model because 
they were unavailable. 
Based on the previously established threshold based on Smets and van Ham (2013), the 
following variables were included (a full list of the variables, their measurements and 
summary statistics is available in Appendix 2). The dependent variable turnout 
dichotomizes individuals who have voted from those who have not (0: Did not vote; 1: 
Voted). Age was divided into age groups (1: Less than 30; 2: 30-39; 3: 40-49; 4: 50-59; 
5: 60-69; 6: More than 70), gender as 1: Male and 2: Female, and education into 1: no 
formal education, 2: primary education, 3: secondary education, and 4: tertiary education 
– these were the only socio-demographic variables added, given the decrease in the 
explanatory power of these variables documented in the literature and the fact that these 
were the only variables from the resource model surpassing the pre-defined criteria. 
Organizational membership, from the mobilization model, was built from a compound 
index of the following dichotomous questions (0: No; 1: Yes): “Are you a member of a 
union?”, “Are you a member of a business or employers’ association?”, “Are you a 
member of a farmers’ association?”, and “Are you a member of a professional 
association?”. Whenever the respondent answered positively to at least one of these 
questions organizational membership was coded as 1; if the respondent always answered 
negatively organizational membership was coded as 0. Turnout on the previous election 
refers to rational choice models and is the most powerful control. Voting is a learning and 
habit-forming process and hence having voted on previous elections minimizes the costs 
of voting for current elections and repeatedly reinforces the probability to vote along the 
life course. Past voting is usually highly predictive of current turnout, especially when it 
reports to the last elections held. It was dichotomized into 0: did not vote in the previous 
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elections and 1: voted on the previous election. Strength of party identification was coded 
as follows: not having a party identification (0), not very close (1), somewhat close (2), 
and very close (3). Political efficacy5 was measured through the question “Who people 
vote for makes a difference?” and political sophistication6 was built out of three political 
knowledge questions identical across CSES electoral studies. These three variables are 
categorized into psychological models. 
Political attitudes towards parties and leaders, from rational choice models, were 
operationalized in the variables rating of the respondent’s most liked party7 and rating of 
the respondent’s most liked leader. The CSES – as all the NES used – asks respondents 
to rate each party and leader running for election on a 0-10 like-dislike scale, leading to 
a set of different variables measuring each party/leader’s likeability. From a modelling 
perspective, including one variable per each leader and party would render the results 
incomparable across countries and impossible to interpret. Instead, the strategy employed 
was to take the value of the party and leader highest rated, among all options for each 
country, and create the most liked leader and party variables. Besides, it seems reasonable 
to assume that, in principle, if any party or leader is to have an impact on turnout decisions 
that will be the party or leader most liked by the respondent. 
 
                                                          
5 Scale from 1: Who people vote for won’t make a difference to 5: Who people vote for can make a big 
difference. 
6 0: All answers incorrect; 1: One correct answer; 2: Two correct answers; 3: All answers correct. In 
Module 4, four political knowledge questions were available, rather than three. To mirror the procedure 
adopted for Module 3, only the first three of these questions were considered. 
7 This variable was not available in the Spanish and the Italian National Election Studies. Propensities to 
vote were used in its place and coded in the same way. 
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3.3. Independent variables 
The use of leader like-dislike scales has been preferred over the use of variables capturing 
leaders’ personal attributes solely due to methodological constraints, as there is no reason 
to assume that the same kind of relationship would not hold had the latter been used 
instead. Nevertheless, the inclusion of variables tapping leaders’ personal attributes in 
European election studies (which constitute core focus of the argument) is very limited. 
Its use over like-dislike scales would result in a very restricted sample of countries. Since 
the aim of this study is to demonstrate the widespread importance of leader evaluations 
for turnout decisions in contemporary Western democracies, a large-N comparative 
approach has been privileged. Furthermore, such an approach would not be possible using 
the CSES dataset. As such, important advantages for comparative studies such as having 
harmonized variables using the same question wording across countries would have to be 
discarded. Finally, the availability of like-dislike scales for both leaders and parties allows 
for direct comparisons between them using the same measurement scales, which would 
be impossible using personal attributes. In sum, despite acknowledging the potentials of 
a framework including leaders’ personal attributes, using like-dislike scales serves better 
the overall purpose of the study. 
Using like-dislike scales to measure both party and leader evaluations also allows to 
capture for short-term variations in party and leader likeability, which are not measured 
through party identification variables, designed to reflect the stability of an enduring 
affective relationship. In the context of pronounced decline of party identification over 
the past decades, larger shares of the electorate have been reporting not having an 
identification with any political party (Dalton, 2002). However, a considerable share of 
these individuals continues to vote, to nurture interest for politics, and even to be quite 
politically sophisticated (Dalton, 2012). Non-identifiers have been shown to make short-
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term assessments of the performances of political parties and candidates and take them 
into account in their voting decision (Fiorina, 1981). The increase of swing voters and 
late deciders also demonstrates the growing consideration of short-term assessments 
(Dalton, 2012; Lavine, Johnston and Steenbergen, 2012; Lobo, 2015). In conclusion, a 
substantial part of the electorate does not have enduring loyalty bonds with political 
parties and therefore its proximity to political parties cannot be measured on a long-term 
basis. The considerable number of voters without an identification with a political party 
is noticeable in this study’s data, although with some variation among election studies 
(Figure 1). 
 





For this reason, the use of likeability scales for both party and leader evaluations gains 
pertinence because it can account for the volatility of party preferences and apply to types 
of voters who do not have a party identification. These range from the disengaged voter 
who sporadically is mobilized by a party or leader, to the politically independent 
assiduous voter whose ballot is not promised to any party or leader beforehand but is 
contingent on progressive assessments made on the run. 
Moreover, the joint consideration of party and leader evaluations is important from a 
theoretical point of view, given the everlasting debate about party and leader effects, and 
their possible interdependence. Despite an overwhelming majority of studies – 
particularly the most recent ones – providing evidence in favour of the personalization of 
politics, there are also some studies finding only limited effects, or a stronger effect of 
party attachments on voting behaviour (e.g. Curtice and Hunjan, 2011; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson, 2011). The same can be argued regarding election campaigns (Kriesi, 2012; 
Wilke and Reinmann, 2001). Hence, the phenomenon is not entirely undisputed, as parties 
are still an importance reference, at least to some voters. Therefore, it is still important to 
consider the role parties may still hold and its interplay with leader evaluations. 
Finally, the use of like-dislike scales is sometimes criticized because of being a relative 
measure, varying according to each individual’s subjective value attribution to each point 
of the scale. Moreover, it has been argued that it is unclear which factors voters actually 
do consider when they rate parties or leaders based on their likeability, casting some 
doubts about what exactly is being measured (Fiorina 1981, 154). This distortion 
problem, named Differential Item Functioning (DIF), has been most notoriously 
addressed by Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) and, more recently, Hare et al. (2015). To 
account for this issue, two different measures of leader evaluations – an absolute and a 
relative – and their vulnerability to DIF were considered (see section 5.2. for a detailed 
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description of the measures). While the absolute measure was halved when accounting 
for latent perceptual distortions, the relative measure remained virtually unaltered. In any 
case, the identification of a strong convergence between the two measures (as in Figure 
5, section 5.2.) relaxes concerns regarding DIF. 
 
3.4. Analytical strategy 
Regarding the model estimation strategy adopted in next section, logistic regression 
models with fixed election-study effects were used. These models are suitable for this 
type of large-N analysis because they account for different sample sizes and 
country/election-study specificities which could produce biased the estimates. In this 
way, the differences in time and among countries across election studies are controlled 
for. As reported at the end of the results’ section, the estimations were subjected to leave-
one-out cross-validation tests to check for outliers which might be driving the results. The 
results from section 4 were also subjected to an extensive battery of robustness tests in 
section 5, focusing on alternative measurements of the key variables (leader and party 
evaluations, as well as party identification) and subjects’ ex-post rationalization on 
reported evaluations.  
In section 6, instead, the model estimation strategy considered contextual moderator 
variables at the election-study level, introduced to explore the existence of differences in 
effects across political and electoral systems. For this reason, this time a multilevel model 
estimation was employed. Random-slopes were also included to gauge eventual variation 





The analyses are based on a logistic regression with fixed country effects for a total of 50 
election studies from 25 countries. Five models were tested: model 1, including all the 
covariates but the party and the leader like-dislike scale; model 2, including the party like-
dislike scale; model 3 including the leader like-dislike scale (and removing the party); 
model 4, including all the covariates plus the party and leader evaluation variables; and 
model 5, adding two interaction terms combining leader evaluations with strength of party 
identification and turnout on the previous election. A step-by-step approach to the model 
was preferred because it allows to observe how the party and leader evaluations variables 
perform both independently and together. This is desirable given the previously 
mentioned high correlation between them and the literature debate concerning the 
importance of parties vis-à-vis leaders for the vote. The results are presented in Table 1 
and show a significant positive effect of voters’ evaluations of political leaders on turnout. 
The results from the model 1 largely reflect what has been established in the literature. 
Turnout behaviour on the previous election is the strongest predictor of current turnout. 
In fact, this is the variable with the highest impact across all the models estimated. This 
was expected and comes in line with the literature perceiving voting as a self-reinforcing 
habit formation process – once an individual has voted before, the costs of voting (namely 
concerning information barriers, in certain cases registration, etc.) in subsequent elections 
are lower, for example. Two sorts of concerns can be raised at this point regarding 
previous turnout’s high estimates. The first is associated with the risk of tautological 
claims that turnout is explained by turnout (in the past). The second relates to the possible 
correlations between previous turnout and the remaining covariates – in particular, much 
of partisanship’s variance may be captured by previous turnout. To address these 
concerns, all models were re-estimated without turnout in the previous election. The 
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results, in Appendix 3, rebut such concerns, as the effects of the key predictors are only 
slightly altered.  
The degree of party identification and political sophistication appear to also have a strong 
effect on turnout. The direction of the effect is as expected, placing the individuals with 
stronger long-term attachments with a given political party as more likely to cast a vote, 
as well as individuals with a higher degree of political sophistication.  
Model 2 introduces voters’ evaluations of their most liked party on a 0 to 10 likeability 
scale. This variable differs from party identification because it may reflect short-term 
attitudes towards political parties, whereas party identification reflects a stable attachment 
based on a long-term psychological identification with a political party, rooted in early 
socialization (Campbell et al., 1960). In this sense, a voter may have a long-term 
identification with a given party but presently be unsatisfied with that party’s performance 
and like other more. Alternatively, she may not have a party identification at all, but at a 
given moment in time like a political party more than its competitors and be driven to 
vote by that feeling. These evaluations may be shaped by a number of contextual factors 
such as retrospective or prospective evaluations of parties’ performances, chosen 
candidates, political events, etc. According to revisionist theories of party identification 
as a running tally (Fiorina, 1981), these short-term assessments may later on 
consubstantiate in transformations at the party identification level but they are primarily 
distinct from the concept of party identification. This distinction is confirmed by the 
moderate correlation (.38) between the two variables in the dataset. Party evaluations are 
significant and have a substantial effect size: for each point increase in the party 
likeability scale, the chances of turning out to vote increase by 21%.  
 
Table 1 - Logistic regression model of leader effects on turnout with fixed election-study effects (25 countries) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
OR OR 95% CI OR OR 95% CI OR OR 95% CI OR OR 95% CI OR OR 95% CI 
Age (groups)  
Ref. category = Less than 30 
          
 30-39 1.09* 
(.05) 
1.01 – 1.19 1.13** 
(.05) 
1.04 – 1.24 1.09* 
(.05) 
1.00 – 1.19 1.12** 
(.05) 
1.03 – 1.23 1.13** 
(.05) 
1.03 – 1.23 
 40-49 1.34*** 
(.06) 
1.23 – 1.46 1.40*** 
(.06) 
1.28 – 1.53 1.34*** 
(.06) 
1.23 – 1.46 1.39*** 
(.06) 
1.27 – 1.52 1.39*** 
(.06) 
1.27 – 1.52 
 50-59 1.51*** 
(.07) 
1.38 – 1.65 1.58*** 
(.07) 
1.44 – 1.73 1.51*** 
(.07) 
1.38 – 1.66 1.57*** 
(.07) 
1.43 – 1.72 1.58*** 
(.07) 
1.44 – 1.73 
 60-99 1.87*** 
(.09) 
1.70 – 2.06 1.95*** 
(.10) 
1.77 – 2.15 1.82*** 
(.09) 
1.65 – 2.00 1.91*** 
(.10) 
1.73 – 2.11 1.93*** 
(.10) 
1.74 – 2.13 
 More than 70 1.61*** 
(.08) 
1.46 – 1.79 1.64*** 
(.09) 
1.48 – 1.83 1.56*** 
(.08) 
1.40 – 1.73 1.61*** 
(.09) 
1.44 – 1.79 1.63*** 
(.09) 
1.46 – 1.81 
Gender 1.06* 
(1.03) 
1.00 – 1.12 1.02 
(.03) 
.97 – 1.08 1.04 
(.03) 
.99 – 1.10 1.02 (.03) .97 – 1.08 .1.02 (.03) .97 – 1.08 
Education 1.32***  
(.03) 
1.27 – 1.37 1.35*** 
(.03) 
1.30 – 1.41 1.34*** 
(.03) 
1.29 – 1.40 1.36***  
(.03) 
1.31 – 1.41 1.36***  
(.03) 
1.30 – 1.41 
Political efficacy 1.35*** 
(.01) 
1.32 – 1.37 1.29*** 
(.01) 
1.26 – 1.32 1.30*** 
(.01) 
1.27 – 1.33 1.28*** 
(.01) 
1.26 – 1.31 1.29*** 
(.01) 
1.26 – 1.32 
Strength of PID 1.62*** 
(.02) 




1.34 – 1.43 1.47*** 
(.02) 
1.42 – 1.51 1.37*** 
(.02) 
1.33 – 1.42 1.39*** 
(.02) 
1.34 – 1.43 
Org. membership 1.29*** 
(.05) 
1.20 – 1.39 1.28*** 
(.05) 
1.19 – 1.38 1.28*** 
(.05) 
1.19 – 1.38 1.28*** 
(.05) 
1.18 – 1.37 1.28*** 
(.05) 
1.18 – 1.37 
Pol. sophistication 1.37*** 
(.02) 
1.33 – 1.42 1.35*** 
(.02) 
1.31 – 1.40 1.35*** 
(.02) 
1.31 – 1.39 1.35*** 
(.02) 
1.31 – 1.39 1.35*** 
(.02) 
1.30 – 1.39 




6.72 – 7.55 6.28*** 
(.20) 
5.91 – 6.68 6.55 *** 
(.20) 
6.18 – 6.96 6.23*** 
(.20) 
5.85– 6.62 6.06*** 
(.20) 
5.69 – 6.46 
Party evaluations   1.21*** 
(.01) 
1.19 – 1.22    1.17*** 
(.01) 
1.15 – 1.19 1.16*** 
(.01) 
1.15 – 1.18 
Leader evaluations     1.16*** 
(.01) 
1.14 – 1.17 1.05*** 
(.01) 
1.04 – 1.07 1.03*** 
(.01) 
1.01 – 1.05 
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* p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001  
Standard errors between parenthesis 
In model 5, the interacting variables are mean centered  
Leader*Strength PID         .96*** 
(.01) 
.95 – .98 
Leader*Previous 
turnout 
        .95** 
(.01) 
.93 – .98 
N 61961 59974 60690 59574 59574 
AIC 38570.57 36015.03 36978.34 35661.16 35623.85 
BIC 39085.52 36537.12 37501.13 36191.87 36172.55 
McFadden’s R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
In model 3, voters’ evaluations of their most liked party were replaced by voters’ 
evaluations of their most liked leader, which proves to have a statistically significant 
impact on turnout. This results in only a small increase of the effect size of the degree of 
party identification, still quite distant from the coefficient of model 1. The other covariates 
remain almost unchanged. The most important conclusion to draw from the comparison 
of the results of model 3 with model 2 relates to the similar effect size of party and leader 
evaluations. This suggests that short-term evaluations of leaders vis-à-vis parties are of 
similar importance for turnout: for each point increase in the leader likeability scale, the 
chances of turning out to vote increase by 16%.  
Inasmuch as leaders are perceived as secondary when compared to political parties, what 
is tested in model 4 – when party and leader evaluations are included simultaneously – 
consists of a fairly strong test for the impact of leader evaluations on turnout. The fact 
that leader evaluations are still significant and have a non-negligible effect on turnout, 
despite probably being underestimated because of its relationship with party evaluations, 




Figure 2 - Effect of leader evaluations on turnout (Average Adjusted Probabilities, 
model 4) 
 
The marginal effect of this relationship is plotted in Figure 2. The increase in the 
probability to turn out for an average individual who rates his preferred leader on the first 
point of the scale (0) compared to an average individual who rates his preferred leader on 
the last point of the scale (10) is of about 8 percentage points. The histogram in the 
background of Figure 2 reflects the distribution of the leader evaluations variable. The 
distribution is substantially skewed towards the higher values of the scale given the nature 
of the variable, which intentionally selected each respondent’s most liked leader. Despite 
the lower amount of cases in the first points of the scale, this did not affect too much the 
confidence intervals. Hence, leader evaluations do have a relevant impact on the 
probability to turnout regardless of the introduction of strong controls such as party 
evaluations, party identification and turnout on the previous election. These results 
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confirm H1 and point towards the inclusion of voters’ assessments of candidates in 
turnout models as a relevant explanatory variable. 
 
4.1. Interaction effects: the moderator effect of party identification and past turnout 
Model 5 provides a more refined assessment of the effect of leaders on turnout by adding 
interactions terms to the previous models. Previous research has demonstrated that voters 
without party identification are more detached from partisan bonds and thus are more 
likely to consider short-term factors such as the personal appeal of political leaders in 
their vote choice decisions (Lobo, 2015). To test if the same applies to turnout decisions, 
leader evaluations were interacted with respondents’ degree of party identification. This 
interaction was found to be significant, demonstrating that leader effects on turnout are 
particularly strong among individuals without party identification (Figure 3). In fact, as 
expected based on dealignment theory, leader evaluations appear to be relatively 
irrelevant for voters who nurture strong bonds with political parties. Conversely, for those 
without party identification – and, to a lesser degree, for those with weak partisan 
attachments –, the effect of leader evaluations on turnout decisions is fairly strong. This 
is a relevant finding since it points towards possible positive normative implications of 
the personalization of politics. Leaders seem to be particularly able to catalyse the most 
disengaged voters and, as such, their mobilizing potential may prove normatively 
desirable. 
 
Figure 3 – Interaction effects between leader evaluations and strength of party 




Still within the framework of dealignment theory, an interaction between leader 
evaluations and turnout on the previous election was tested. This interaction is also 
significant and the dissimilar effects among the two subgroups are clear (Figure 4). While 
the effect of leader evaluations on the probability to turn out remains fairly stable among 
the individuals who turned out on the previous election, there is a substantial increase, of 
more than 10 percentage points, on the probability to turn out among those that did not 
vote on the previous election. This suggests that leader evaluations are a strong factor in 
captivating abstainers and bringing back to voting individuals who have been abstaining 




Figure 4 - Interaction effects between leader evaluations and turnout on the previous 
election (Marginal effects, model 5) 
 
The results from both interactions confirm H2.1. and H2.2. and are indicative of the 
relationship between dealignment and the personalization of politics. Leader evaluations 
are especially relevant for dealigned voters who do not possess a longstanding attachment 
to a political party, or who have been abstaining for more than one election. Hence, while 
the personalization of politics was, to a great extent, a result of the process of dealignment, 
it can also play a role in attenuating its negative impacts, by promoting a reengagement 
of the most alienated segments of the electorate.  
The results regarding the main effects of leader evaluations on turnout and both 
interaction effects reported have been subjected to leave-one-out cross-validation checks 
(see appendixes 6, 7 and 8 for coefficient plots). These tests exclude each election study 
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at the time from the sample to detect if the results substantially changed, i.e., if they were 
being driven by potential outliers. All reported results proved robust to this test.8  
The next section presents an extensive battery of robustness tests concerning the findings 
presented so far. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
 
5.1. Dichotomous measurement of party identification 
It could be argued that the impact of party identification is likely to be more accurately 
measured in binary terms. According to this logic, what would matter for the likelihood 
to turn out is if an individual has a party identification, and not the intensity of this 
identification. If this is true, a more refined measurement may be contributing to an 
underestimation of its effect. In order to assess if this is occurring, the strength of party 
identification variable was replaced by a dichotomous measurement of party 
identification (0: Does not identify with a party; 1: Identifies with a party). The 
standardized coefficients of party and leader evaluations were almost identical, as 
                                                          
8 In addition to the models presented in this section, an additional interaction model analysing the potential 
moderating effect of political sophistication on turnout was estimated in conjunction with the two previous 
interactions (Appendix 10). Political sophistication has been considered a relevant moderator variable by 
previous studies (e.g., Bittner, 2015; Gidengil, 2011; Lachat, 2015). The interaction term deemed positive 
and significant, suggesting that more sophisticated individuals are more likely to be mobilized by party 
leaders. Nevertheless, in this case the model did not survive the leave-one-out cross-validation test – the 
Slovenian election study of 2011 was found to be driving the results (Appendix 9). For this reason, this 
interaction was excluded from the models. In any case, it remains a relevant finding that leader evaluations 
were found not to vary according to voters’ political sophistication. 
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depicted in the regression output from Appendix 4. In fact, the dichotomous measure of 
party identification results in a higher coefficient for leader evaluations. 
 
5.2. Alternative measurement of leader effects 
The original measurement used in the previous models selected the leader respondents 
liked the most out of all the candidates running for election in their country at a given 
point in time. This could be considered an absolute measurement of leader effects. 
However, previous studies point to the importance of testing different measurements of 
leader effects (Mughan, 2015). An alternative measurement could be the difference 
between the most liked leader and the average of all leaders running for election in that 
country, in that year. This could be considered a relative measurement of leader effects 
which would capture how extraordinarily voters consider this leader compared to the 
other contenders. This is useful since some voters can have the tendency to rate all or 
most leaders similarly high (or low). Thus, the models were reran replacing the absolute 
by the relative measurement of leader effects, which, for each respondent, subtracts the 
mean of the leader evaluation variable from the rating of the most liked leader. The model 
comparison in Figure 5 shows that the differences between the two measurements are 





Figure 5 - Absolute and relative measurements of leader effects: model comparison, 
standardized 
 
5.3. Least liked leaders 
A proposition that has so far been untested relates to the possibility that, besides having 
a positive effect of turnout because voters strongly like them, leaders could also drive 
individuals to vote because they strongly dislike them. Examples of this kind abound in 
the literature on strategic voting but they are essentially directed at political parties 
(Downs, 1957). In a context of increasing personalization – particularly affecting 
populist/radical parties where the leader plays a prominent role, but also in mainstream 
parties in light of growing polarization (Lachat, 2015) –, some voters could be driven to 
the polls because they utterly dislike a candidate and want to prevent him from winning 
the election (Aarts & Blais, 2012). Hence, additional models were estimated including 
absolute and relative measurements of the most disliked leaders – reversing the procedure 
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(and scale) used before for the most liked leaders. These were estimated for model 4 
(Figure 6) and in combination with the previous measurements (Appendix 5).9  
Both measurements of disliked leaders proved to have a meaningful and significant 
impact on turnout. The effect is particularly strong for the relative measurement. In the 
case of disliked leaders, the absolute measurement is probably less effective in capturing 
the kind of effects just described, as it may erroneously capture the common setting where 
a respondent ascribes a certain rating to her preferred leader and rates all other leaders 
equally bad – in this setting, there would hardly be an effect of disliked leaders on turnout. 
Instead, the relative measurement of the disliked leader depicts a setting where a leader 
is negatively distinguishable from the average of all other leaders (the liked and the 
relatively indifferent ones), what further motivates individuals to turn out against him.10 
 
                                                          
9 Appendix 5 provides an estimation of the marginal effects of disliked leaders (absolute and relative 
measurements) while controlling for most liked leaders (absolute and relative measurements), and vice-
versa. Thus, the estimates are the same as in Figure 6, but including the correspondent like-dislike 
measurement as a control. 
10 The existence of feelings of indifference towards party leaders was also considered. Indifferent 
individuals would be those evaluating leaders with a 5 on the 0-10 scale. However, the amount of those 
individuals was found not to exceed 9% of the sample. Given their relatively residual character, no further 
analysis was performed with regard to these individuals. 
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Figure 6 - Marginal effects of most liked and disliked leaders (model 4) 
 
5.4. Pre-post assessment 
A frequent critique to existing research on leader effects concerns the possibility of ex-
post rationalization by individuals. To put it simply, because most studies use data 
collected in post-electoral surveys, voters may be driven to adjust their answers to the 
actual outcome of the election. Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias (2008) have documented 
this issue regarding economic voting, for example. If the same occurs with voters’ 
evaluations of candidates, the data collected after the election is inconsistent with what 
voters had in mind when they made their voting decisions and therefore, is inapt to explain 
voting behaviour.  
A possible strategy to assess if this is happening consists in using panel data and 
comparing individuals’ ratings of leaders before and after the election (Garzia and De 
Angelis, 2016). The more similar these ratings are, the surer one can be that what is being 
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observed is not an adjustment as a consequence of the electoral results. CSES data is 
purely cross-sectional and therefore such a test cannot be performed for the entire sample. 
However, some of the countries in the sample have panel data comprising pre and post-
electoral measurements in their national election studies. Data from Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, referring to the same years as the ones in the sample, and 
thus the same individuals (but interviewed pre and post electorally), was used to perform 
this test. 
The main test consists of re-estimating model 4 both pre-electorally and post-electorally. 
For the results to hold, the post-electoral coefficients for leader evaluations should be no 
higher than the pre-electoral ones. In addition, three other indicators were used: the 
correlation between the most liked leader variable and turnout pre-electoral; the 
correlation between the most liked leader variable and turnout post-electoral; and the 
correlation between the pre and the post measurement of the most liked leader. Again, 
ideally the post-electoral measures should correlate with turnout no higher than the pre-
electoral ones. Additionally, the pre*post correlation should be rather high, indicating a 
strong congruence between pre and post-electoral ratings.  
The results from Table 2 confirm the expectation that the electoral impact of leaders does 
not correspond to ex-post rationalizations from voters. First, the regression models clearly 
show higher estimates for pre-electoral leader evaluations across all countries but Spain, 
where the coefficients are precisely the same pre and post-electorally. This provides rather 
strong evidence against any sort of ex-post rationalization. In addition, pre and post-
electoral measurements of leader evaluations correlate fairly high in all four election 
studies, providing strong indications that what is being measured is the same. 
Furthermore, the correlation between pre and post-electoral leader evaluations and 
turnout is very similar across the four countries. Also, in general pre-electoral 
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measurements correlate slightly higher with turnout, whereas one should expect post-
electoral measurements to correlate higher in the case of ex-post rationalization. 
A supplementary test was carried by taking the within-individual variation in leader 
evaluations across pre and post-electoral waves and estimating its impact on turnout. To 
be sure, such strategy was used to investigate whether such increase in an individual’s 
most liked leader’s rating, possibly driven by ex-post rationalization, affects the 
probability to turn out. The coefficient for the within-individual change in leader 
evaluations deemed not significant in both Spain and the United Kingdom, and significant 
(p=.047) with a small effect in the United States. Hence, in general these changes are 
irrelevant to predict turnout and therefore concerns regarding a possible ex-post 





Table 2 - Pre-Post assessment of leader effects in selected countries: logistic model 
coefficients (model 4) and correlations between pre and post measurements of leader 
evaluations and turnout 
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* p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001  
  
 
6. The moderator role of the political and electoral system: an exploratory analysis 
In this section, an exploratory analysis of the differences of leader effects on turnout 
across political and electoral systems is carried out. Certain features of political and 
electoral systems may provide more (un)favourable conditions for the existence of leader 
effects on turnout. This calls the need to consider possible contextual variations that may 
affect the extent to which leaders have a mobilizing potential. The objective is therefore 
to identify whether leader effects on turnout can vary according to three types of factors: 
the regime type, the size of the electoral districts, and the possibility to cast a personalized 
vote.  
The institutional design of presidential systems is argued to favour a candidate-centered 
type of politics. Increased leadership autonomy from the legislature, unipersonal 
executive responsibility, and popular election of the head of government are features that 
contribute to a perception of higher leadership profile among voters and the media in 
presidential countries (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). Contrarily, in parliamentary systems, it 
is claimed to prevail the notion of the Prime-Minister as a primus inter pares, much due 
 Spain United Kingdom United States 
Regression models    
Pre-electoral .04*** .11*** .34*** 
Post-electoral .04*** .09*** .21*** 
Within-individual variance (pre-post) n.s. n.s. .08* 
Correlations    
Pre*turnout .36 .22 .17 
Post*turnout .30 .27 .16 
Pre*post .50 .46 .71 
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to the collective executive responsibility and the fact that the executive emerges and is 
contingent on the confidence of the legislature, making it still very much the arena of 
party organizations. For example, Curtice and Hunjan (2011), as well as Curtice and Lisi 
(2014), found evidence of a weaker impact of leaders on vote choice in parliamentary 
regimes compared to presidential ones. The hybrid semi-presidential design, while on the 
one hand including some elements of presidential systems which could play in favour of 
the personalization hypothesis, on the other hand is also characterized by power-sharing 
dynamics between the President and the Prime-Minister which may downplay the 
perceived profile of party leaders.  
The rationale underlying the consideration of the size of the electoral districts and the 
possibility to cast a personalized vote is related to the concept of decentralized 
personalization. In their seminal article, Balmas et al. (2014, 37) distinguish between 
centralized and decentralized personalization, the latter referring to the cases where the 
“power flows downwards from the group to individual politicians who are not party or 
executive leaders”, such as candidates. Wauters et al. (2016) demonstrate how these two 
processes often involve a zero-sum logic: centralized personalization often emerges at the 
expenses of decentralized personalization and vice-versa. Thus, this is an important 
aspect to take into account, as contexts highly favourable to decentralized personalization 
may damper centralized personalization, namely in the form of leader effects on turnout. 
Regarding district size, in smaller districts leaders could be argued to matter less, given 
that possible proximity connections with local politicians might overshadow party 
leaders. The same kind of rationale can be applied to settings where a personalized vote 
for a given candidate is made possible.  
To assess if the results concerning leader effects on turnout can be influenced by these 
factors, in Table 3, model 4 was used as a baseline model for re-estimation as to account 
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for the political and the electoral system. In specific, in model 6 a cross-level interaction 
between leader evaluations and the type of regime (0. Parliamentary; 1. Semi-
Presidential11; 2. Presidential) was added. As per the electoral system, in model 7 an 
interaction between leader evaluations and the electoral district size12 (number of seats) 
was included, and model 8 accounts for the electoral system’s possibility of casting a 
personalized vote (0: No; 1: Yes). Cross-level interactions between the most liked leader 
variable and the contextual moderators were added in a random slope model (Table 3)  
                                                          
11 Semi-Presidential countries were coded according to Elgie (2011) and an updated version of this piece 
by the author (2017) available at: http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?p=1053 
12 Data unavailability led to the exclusion of Spain (2011), United Kingdom (2010), Slovakia (2016), Serbia 
(2012), Italy (2013), Montenegro (2012) and France (2012) from model 7 and Spain (2011), United 
Kingdom (2010), Slovenia (2011) and Italy (2013) from model 8. 
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Table 3 – The moderator role of the political and electoral system characteristics on 
leader effects on turnout: random effects models 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
Age (groups)  





     
 30-39 1.12* 
(.05) 
1.03 – 1.22 1.21*** 
(.06) 
1.09 – 1.33 1.19*** 
(.06) 
1.08 – 1.31 
 40-49 1.38*** 
(.06) 
1.26 – 1.51 1.52*** 
(.08) 
1.37 – 1.68 1.47*** 
(.07) 
1.34 – 1.62 
 50-59 1.57*** 
(.07) 
1.43 – 1.72 1.66*** 
(.09) 
1.50 – 1.85 1.64*** 
(.08) 
1.48 – 1.81 
 60-99 1.90*** 
(.10) 
1.72 – 2.10 2.06*** 
(.12) 
1.85 – 2.31 2.01*** 
(.11) 
1.81 – 2.24 
 More than 70 1.60*** 
(.09) 
1.43 – 1.78 1.74*** 
(.11) 
1.54 – 1.97 1.68*** 
(.01) 
1.49 – 1.88 
Gender 1.02 (.03) .97 – 1.08 1.00 
(.03) 
.94 – 1.07 1.01 
(.03) 
.96 – 1.08 
Education 1.36 *** 
(.03) 
1.30 – 1.41 1.43*** 
(.04) 
1.36 – 1.50 1.40*** 
(.03) 
1.34 – 1.47 
Political efficacy 1.29*** 
(.01) 
1.26 – 1.32 1.35*** 
(.02) 
1.32 – 1.38 1.33*** 
(.02) 
1.30 – 1.36 
Strength of PID 1.37*** 
(.02) 
1.32 – 1.41 1.38*** 
(.03) 
1.33 – 1.43 1.36*** 
(.02) 
1.32 – 1.41 
Org. membership 1.29*** 
(.05) 
1.20 – 1.39 1.29 
(.06) 
1.18 – 1.41 1.30*** 
(.06) 
1.20 – 1.42 
Pol. sophistication 1.34*** 
(.02) 
1.30 – 1.39 1.34*** 
(.03) 
1.29 – 1.39 1.33*** 
(.02) 
1.28 – 1.38 




5.85 – 6.62 5.82 *** 
(.20) 
5.43 – 6.23 6.11*** 
(.20) 
5.73 – 6.53 
Party evaluations 1.17*** 
(.01) 
1.15 – 1.19 1.13*** 
(.01) 
1.11 – 1.15 1.13*** 
(.01) 
1.11 – 1.16 
Leader evaluations 1.11*** 
(.01) 
1.08 – 1.14 1.07*** 
(.01) 
1.04 – 1.08 1.06*** 
(.01) 
1.03 – 1.08 
Political system .68** 
(.09) 
.51 – .89     
District size   1.00 
(.00) 
.98 – 1.01   
Personalized vote     .72* 
(.11) 







.89 – .94 
    
 Presidential .96 (.04) .89 – 1.04     
Leader*District size   1.00* 
(.00) 
1.00 – 1.00   
Leader*Personalized 
vote 
    .99 (.01) .97 – 1.03 
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* p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001   
Standard errors between parenthesis 
 
 
The results from Table 3 are mixed. Concerning the influence of the regime type, in model 
6 the interaction between leader evaluations and the type of regime results negatively 
significant only with regard to semi-presidential systems, partially rejecting H3. This 
regime type seems less favourable to the existence of leader effects on turnout. As argued 
before, this could be due to the fact that, as Sartori (1997) put it, semi-presidential systems 
operate in a power sharing basis within a dual authority structure. This may contribute to 
take the spotlight away from party leaders or Prime-Ministers, since the political arena is 
shared with Presidents. The non-significant interaction with presidential regimes is 
probably associated with the fact that only one country (two elections) in the entire sample 
is a presidential democracy. This interaction effect was plotted in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 – Interaction effects between leader evaluations and regime type (Marginal 
effects, model 6) 
Var(political system) .44 (.10) .28 – .70   
Var(district size)  .00 (.00) .00 – .00  
Var(personalized 
vote) 
  .56 (.14) .35 – .90 
Var(constant) .31 (.08) .18 – .52 .54 (.14) .32 – .90 .37 (.11) .21 – .66 
N(individuals) 59574 47263 51846 
N(groups) 45 38 41 
AIC 35694.64 27741.91 30454.06 





Regarding the other interactions, in model 7 the interaction with the electoral district’s 
size is significant. However, the magnitude of the effect deems it virtually irrelevant. 
Also, there is almost no variance in the random slope at the district size level. Looking at 
the plotted effects in Figure 8, it becomes clear that the moderating effect of this variable 
is inexistent, as all variation falls within the confidence intervals. Therefore, although 
statistically significant, the substantial significance of this variable is irrelevant. Finally, 
in model 8 leader evaluations were interacted with the possibility to cast a personalized 
vote. This relationship was found not to be significant. In sum, the characteristics of the 
electoral system which could potentially downplay centralized personalization in favour 
of decentralized personalization have no substantial effects, at least regarding the impact 






Figure 8 – Interaction effects between leader evaluations and size of the electoral 




7. Discussion and conclusions 
This study aimed at assessing the importance of voters’ evaluations of political leaders 
on turnout with a two-fold objective: on the one hand, demonstrate that leaders have a 
potential as mobilizing political agents and thus the personalization of politics can have 
positive normative implications for contemporary democracies; on the other hand, by 
providing evidence of a general trend common to several Western democracies where 
leaders have an effect on turnout, call for a more frequent consideration of variables 
related to candidates in turnout models. 
The results have confirmed the hypothesis that leaders have an effect on turnout. Leaders 
were found to matter and to have a substantial impact on the probability to turn out in 
parliamentary elections. This 25-country analysis reveals that this trend is transversal 
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across several Western democracies. As parties still retain most of their traditional 
mobilizing function, party leaders also carry a considerable mobilization potential in 
current elections.  
Furthermore, the mobilizing potential of leaders was found to be particularly notorious 
amongst the most dealigned voters. Individuals who lack attachments to political parties 
and individuals who have abstained in the previous election are the ones most impacted 
in their turnout decisions by assessments of party leaders. While the personalization of 
politics has often been portrayed as an overall negative phenomenon for contemporary 
democracies, leaders’ effective appeal to the most structurally disengaged segments of 
the electorate might counterbalance such views. In the last decades, Western party 
systems were hit by rising abstention rates, a consistent decline in support for political 
parties, and a generalized public sentiment of scepticism towards politics. Finding that 
party leaders have the potential to compensate for at least some of these malaises by being 
able to reconnect dealigned citizens with active political participation can make a case for 
a positive normative outlook on the personalization of politics.  
Importantly, the results appear quite robust and do not seem to be much affected by 
possibly intervening features of the countries’ electoral systems which could play against 
leader effects on turnout. More personalized electoral systems, prone to a decentralized 
type of personalization, seem relatively unimportant in moderating the relationship 
between leader effects and turnout. As per the political system’s characteristics, leader 
effects seem to be slightly hindered by semi-presidential regimes. A possible explanation 
relates to this system’s dual executive nature, which may overshadow party leaders’ role 
as fundamental actors. 
This study opens some avenues for further research on the topic. First, following the 
mobilizing potential just described, regarding its positive normative consequences, it 
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would be interesting to determine which aspects of voters’ assessments of candidates 
drive them to turnout. Are these voters triggered by apolitical features or can leaders 
communicate party platforms more efficiently, vouch for a competent government 
leadership or even voice voters’ demands in their public interventions in a way that 
develops a more personal identification than with regard to a political party? From a 
normative perspective, in principle, it can be claimed that if leaders have the potential to 
bring more individuals to participate in democratic elections, particularly in a context of 
decreasing turnout, the personalization of politics can carry positive consequences.  
However, if rather than leaders’ performance-related characteristics, these individuals are 
driven to vote by superficial and apolitical judgements of leaders, such positive normative 
consequences can be questioned. An exploratory study by Silva & Costa (2018) has shed 
some light on this, but more extensive research is needed. 
Second, additional research with the use of panel data could allow for a better perception 
of the role of leader evaluations in fostering turnout across time, that is, to what has this 
variable been becoming more relevant over the past decades – in parallel with the process 
of dealignment – in comparison with long-term determinants of turnout. Naturally, given 
the scarcity of panel data, this could only be achieved in respect to fewer countries than 
the ones analysed here. 
Third, it would be relevant to expand on the current exploratory section on the moderating 
role of contextual variables. It would be interesting to consider different party types 
(although such data is frequently hard to obtain) or the type of electoral system 
(majoritarian, proportional, two-party), for example. Such analysis could provide a more 
nuanced account of to what extend and under which circumstances do leaders matter more 
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1. List of countries and election studies included 
Country 
 Election year 
N 
Country 

















































































































































2. Summary measures of the variables included in the models 
 




Turnout – (0: Did not vote; 1: Voted) 
0 1 .82 .38 
Age – Numeric 16 106 48.42 17.45 
Age (groups) – (1: Less than 30; 2: 30-39; 3: 40-49; 
4: 50-59; 5: 60-69; 6: More than 70) 
1 6 3.36 1.64 
Gender – (1: Male; 2: Female) 1 2 1.52 .50 
Education – (1: No formal education; 2: Primary 
education; 3: Secondary education; 4: Tertiary 
education) 
1 4 2.84 .78 
Org. member – (0: Not a member; 1: Member) 0 1 .25 .44 
Pol. Efficacy – (1: Who people vote for won’t 
make a difference; 5: Who people vote for can 
make a big difference) 
1 5 3.72 1.30 
Strength of PID – (0: No PID; 1: Not very close; 2: 
Somewhat close; 3: Very close) 
0 3 1.08 1.08 
Pol. Sophistication – (0: No correct answers; 1: 
One correct answer; 2: Two correct answers; 3: 
Three correct answers) 
0 3 1.51 1.01 
Previous turnout – (0: Did not vote in the previous 
election; 1: Voted in the previous election) 
0 1 .83 .38 
Party evaluations – (0: Does not like the party; 10: 
Likes the party) 
0 10 7.70 2.08 
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Leader evaluations – (0: Does not like the leader; 
10: Likes the leader) 
0 10 7.66 2.02 
Political system – (0: Parliamentary; 1: Semi-
Presidential; 2: Presidential) 
0 2 .61 .58 
District size – Numeric 0 150 22.65 40.33 




3. Comparison of the marginal effects for key variables of model 4, with and without 




4. Logistic regression with fixed country effects (25 countries) – Dichotomous measure 
of PID – standardized coefficients, model 5 
 OR OR 95% CI 
Age (groups)  
Ref. category = Less than 30 
  
 30-39 1.13** (.05) 1.04 – 1.23 
 40-49 1.41*** (.06) 1.29 – 1.54 
 50-59 1.62*** (.08) 1.48 – 1.77 
 60-99 1.98*** (.10) 1.79 – 2.18 
 More than 70 1.69*** (.09) 1.52 – 1.88 
Gender 1.01 (.03) .96 – 1.07 
Education 1.36*** (.03) 1.31 – 1.42 
Political efficacy 1.30*** (.01) 1.27 – 1.33 
Dichotomous PID 2.25*** (.25) 1.82 – 2.79 
Org. membership 1.30*** (.05) 1.20 – 1.40 
Pol. sophistication 1.35*** (.02) 1.31 – 1.40 
Turnout on the previous 
election 
8.70*** (.90) 7.11 – 10.64 
Party evaluations 1.18*** (.01) 1.16 – 1.20 
Leader evaluations 1.10*** (.01) 1.08 – 1.13 
Leader*Dichotomous PID .96* (.01) .94 – .99 









* p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001  
Standard errors between parenthesis
5. Marginal effects of most liked and disliked leaders, while controlling for most disliked 
and most liked leaders, respectively – absolute and relative measurements. Fixed country 
effects logistic regression (25 countries) – standardized coefficients, model 4. 
  
BIC 36560.71 
McFadden’s R2 .29 
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6. Leave-one-out cross-validation tests (LOOCV) for the effect of leader evaluations on 





7. Leave-one-out cross-validation tests (LOOCV) for the interaction effect between 





8. Leave-one-out cross-validation tests (LOOCV) for the interaction effect between 





9. Leave-one-out cross-validation tests (LOOCV) for the interaction effect between 





10. Logistic regression with fixed country effects (25 countries) – Interaction between 
leader evaluations and political sophistication, standardized coefficients 
 
 OR OR 95% CI 
Age 
Ref. Category = Less than 30 
  
 30-39 1.13** (.05) 1.03 – 1.23 
 40-49 1.39*** (.06) 1.27 – 1.53 
 50-59 1.58*** (.07) 1.44 – 1.74 
 60-99 1.93*** (.10) 1.75 – 2.13 
 More than 70 1.63*** (.09) 1.46 – 1.81 
Gender 1.02 (.03) .97 – 1.08 
Education 1.36*** (.03) 1.31 – 1.41 
Political efficacy 1.29*** (.01) 1.26 – 1.31 
Strength of PID 1.87*** (.01) 1.66 – 2.12 
Org. membership 1.28** (.05) 1.19 – 1.38 
Pol. Sophistication 1.17** (.06) 1.07 – 1.30 
Turnout on the previous election 8.92*** (.92) 7.28 – 10.92 
Party evaluations 1.16*** (.01) 1.15 – 1.18 
Leader evaluations 1.09*** (.02) 1.06 – 1.12 
Leader*Strength of PID .96*** (.01) .95 – .98 
Leader*Political Sophistication 1.02** (.06) 1.06 – 1.30 






McFadden’s R2 .29 
AIC 35617.9 
BIC 36175.59 
